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GOD AND ABSTRACT ENTITIES
Brian Leftow

Alvin Plantinga's Does God Have a Nature? has ignited debate over God's
relations to abstract entities. Recently Thomas Morris and Christopher
Menzel have suggested a way to maintain that God creates all abstract entities, including those attributes which He instances essentially. After defending the Morris-Menzel position against some initial objections, I argue that
it generates the unacceptable consequence that God creates Himself and fails
to secure the claim that God creates His nature. In closing I suggest that
Aquinas' claim that God is "purely actual" may avoid the problems of Morris
and Menzel's view and secure the relation of God to abstract entities which
they favor.

There appears to be a conflict between traditional theism and the Platonist
ontologies which many contemporary philosophers favor. Traditional theism
holds that God is the creator of everything distinct from Himself, and that
whatever God creates depends on God for its existence. So traditional theism
entails that whatever is distinct from God depends on God for its existence.
Contemporary Platonist ontologies affirm the existence of such abstract entities as possible worlds, propositions and attributes. To Platonists, all these
abstracta are distinct from God, and most exist by "broadly logical" necessity.1 Necessary beings seem not to depend on God for their existence. If
something exists necessarily, we want to say, it exists simply because it is
this thing's nature to exist, just as God, according to Descartes' ontological
argument, exists because it is His nature to exist. If necessary abstract entities
do not depend on God for their existence, then by positing these, contemporary Platonism contradicts the traditional theistic claim that whatever is distinct from God depends on God for its existence.
Alvin Plantinga, at once Platonist and theist, addresses the apparent inconsistency of theism and Platonism in his Does God Have a Nature?2 Plantinga
reasons that if necessary truths are indeed necessary, the abstract entities their
truth-conditions involve exist necessarily: if it must be the case that 7+5=12,
then it must be the case that the number 7 exists. But having said this,
Planting a asks whether we can
explain the existence ofthe number 7 by citing the fact that it is part of God's
nature to affirm its existence ... If we can ... then perhaps we can point to an
important dependence of abstract objects upon God ... 3
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In his APA Presidential address, delivered some two years later, Plantinga
affirms this dependence:
A proposition exists because God thinks of or conceives it. .. propositions are
best thought of as the thoughts of God ... God is a necessary being who has
essentially the property of thinking just the thoughts he does think; these
thoughts, then, are conceived or thought by God in every possible world and
hence exist necessarily.4

Plantinga thus tries to harmonize Platonism and traditional theism by denying
that propositions exist by their very natures. Rather, Plantinga suggests, propositions exist necessarily but nonetheless depend on God, being thoughts
which He thinks in all possible worlds. In their "Absolute Creation," Thomas
Morris and Christopher Menzel endorse Plantinga's reconciliation of traditional theism and Platonism and extend it to the rest of the Platonic domain:
numbers, attributes, etc. are for them God's "ideas," and exist only because
God thinks them. 3 Morris and Menzel dub their extension of Plantinga' s view
"theistic activism." I want to suggest that theistic activism's picture of God's
relation to abstract entities is false, and suggest an alternative picture.
I. Can necessary beings depend on God?

For theistic activism, abstract necessary beings depend on God. In fact,
according to activism, abstract entities exist necessarily only because God
necessarily exists and necessarily thinks them. This claim is surprising. Thus
theistic activism's first order of business must be to explain how a genuinely
necessary being can owe its existence to God. I think activism can do this,
and I will briefly suggest how.
If the activist claim surprises us, it is because we believe (for instance) that
for any x, if x exists necessarily, then x is uncausable, or of independent
existence, or that for any x, if x exists necessarily, then x exists in virtue of
its nature. If we believe either conditional, we believe it because we think
that the nature of necessity renders this claim true. But an activist can argue
that these (and any other such) conditionals are false, and derive their specious plausibility from insufficiently precise understandings of alethic necessity. In currently popular semantics, "x exists necessarily" asserts only that
x is to be found in every possible world. It entails nothing at all about why
this is so; it leaves open the question of whether there may be some cause or
causes which account for this. If this is so, the conditionals just mentioned
may well be false, and so may well not create difficulty for the claim that
necessary beings depend on God. In any event, it seems that intuitions about
necessity do not conflict with activism, for they do not warrant the conditionals mentioned.
Philosophers in fact have intuitions to which activists can appeal. Many
philosophers, like Kant, find ontological arguments for God's existence du-
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bious because these seem to infer God's real existence from the fact that the
concept of God includes His being a necessary existent. As Jerome Shaffer
puts it,
even if we have ... the concept of an object which necessarily exists, a further
question remains whether any existent meets the specifications of the concept. 6

Let us say that if an entity A is such that if it exists, it exists necessarily, then
A is necessary by nature. Then what Shaffer asserts is that for any A, knowing
that A is necessary by nature is not sufficient for knowing that A exists. If
we leave aside the question of whether God may not be an exception, most
philosophers will agree with this. Shaffer's point raises a question, though:
what explains this insufficiency? The explanation may be that knowledge that
A is necessary by nature is not of the right kind to warrant our asserting that
A exists. Or it may be that however much we know about A, our knowledge
of A's nature is never sufficient to let us know whether A is both a possible
being and necessary by nature. Both explanations are compatible with its
being the case that" A is necessary by nature" entails" A exists"; they merely
assert that even if this is so, we do not know enough to take advantage of the
entailment. But I think Shaffer's point, with which many philosophers agree,
is that" A is necessary by nature" just does not entail" A exists." This is the
intuition to which theistic activism can appeal. For if "A is necessary by
nature" does not entail" A exists," one may ask what accounts for the failure
of this entailment. Theistic activism can recommend itself by offering an
answer to this question, namely that even if" A is necessary by nature" is
true, something more is needed for A to exist, and the something needed is
a cause able to account for the fact that A exists at all.
There is clearly a lot more to be said here on both sides.' But perhaps this
at least suggests that being necessary by nature does not preclude depending
on God for existence. In any event, even if this point is granted, there is
another likely line of attack on theistic activism. A critic may contend that
we can make no sense of the dependence a necessary being is said to have
on God. The critic may have something like the following in mind. If my
match's lighting depends on my striking it, I can explain this by saying that
if I had not struck it and if no relevantly similar event had occurred, the match
would not have lit. But it is not clear that a theistic activist can similarly flesh
out his assertion that necessary beings depend on God. An activist can certainly say that
1. had God not created it, proposition P would not exist.

According to theistic activism, "God created P" is necessarily true. Thus on
activist principles, (l)'s antecedent is necessarily false, and so (1) is true.
But on activist principles, it also seems true that
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2. had God not created it, P would still exist, and
3. had nothing created it, P would still exist, and
4. if God did not exist, P would stilI exist.

For if "God created P" is necessarily true, (2)-(4) have necessarily false
antecedents. If (2)-(4) are true, though, one may well suspect that the claim
that P depends on God has no content, even if (1) is also true.
Let me try to allay this suspicion. (4) poses no problem peculiar to theistic
activism. If God exists necessarily, then if in (4) one replaces "P" with a
name of any contingent entity, the resulting proposition will be true. So any
problem (4) raises for the claim that God creates necessary beings arises as
well for the claim that God creates contingent beings. This does not show
that (4) creates no trouble for theistic activism. My point is only that any
trouble it creates arises because activism incorporates the claim that God
exists necessarily, not because of any peculiarity of the dependence which
activism claims necessary beings to have on God. (2) and (3) are a bit trickier.
But I think activism can deal with them (and also dispose of (4» by urging
that not all conditional propositions with impossible antecedents are created
equal. Rather, the activist may say, where a conditional's antecedent involves
God's not existing, special rules apply in virtue of God's special relation to
propositions. 8 At first glance, this move has an air of hopeless ad hocery. I
think we can lessen this appearance by showing that it is well-grounded in
the activist theory of God's nature and creative role.
To activism, if God does not exist, nothing else necessary or contingent
exists either: the only world in which God does not exist is the (absolutely)
null world. This renders God's non-existence unlike any other impossible
state of affairs. To explain this, I need to set out some theses about possible
worlds. I propose that a non-null world is a set of propositions which for
every atomic proposition P either includes P or includes not-P, and that a
possible world is a non-null-world-sized set of propositions which is consistent, Le., such that all its member propositions can be true together. I also
propose that the null world is the null set of propositions. As I am advocating
a set-theoretic view of possible worlds, I take it that there is neither more nor
less difficulty in talk of the null world than in talk of the null set.
If God is a necessary being, any world in which God does not exist (Le.,
the null world) is an impossible world. But we need not say that every
impossible world is the null world. A set of propositions can be both a
non-null world and inconsistent.
For instance, suppose that there is a set S of propositions such that for all
atomic propositions P save for a proposition Q, S includes P or includes not-P,
but not both, and
5. S includes Q, and
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6. S includes not-Q.

If «5) . (6» is true, then «5) v (6» is true. But our definition of worldhood

requires only that «5) v (6» be true. Hence S is a world, and an impossible
world, then, will be either the null world or an inconsistent world-sized set
of propositions, such as S.
Any impossibility except for God's nonexistence, including the nonexistence of necessary beings other than God, occurs in some set of inconsistent
worlds. But God's non-existence occurs only in the null world. Any world
containing God's non-existence is ipso facto identical with the null world.
That God's non-existence occurs in the null world does not entail that the
proposition "God does not exist" exists in the null world. It does not exist
there. In the null world, no propositions exist, and so none are true (or false).
God's nonexistence is a logical "black hole," sucking all the propositions of
a world into itself. But while nothing is true in the null world, there are truths
(and falsehoods) about the null world, e.g., that it is null and that God does
not exist in it. 9 The propositions expressing these truths exist only in other,
non-null worlds.
This metaphysical framework expresses the unique status God's non-existence must have among impossibilities according to activism. It also lets us
distinguish semantically between counterfactuals whose impossible antecedents involve God's not existing and counterfactuals whose impossible antecedents do not. From any ordinary impossibility, anything whatsoever
follows. Thus if any ordinary impossibility were actual, all other states of
affairs would be actual and possible. But God's nonexistence occurs only in
the null world. If God did not exist, no states of affairs would be actual or
possible. Thus God's nonexistence is in fact unlike any other impossibility,
on the activist view of things. Because an ordinary impossibility entails
everything, we usually assign trivial truth to all conditionals with ordinarily
impossible antecedents. Any conditional with an antecedent involving God's
nonexistence is a claim about the null world. This permits us to say that some
such conditionals are non-trivially true and others are non-trivially false. For
instance, in the null world, nothing exists. So any proposition entailing that
something exists in the null world will be non-trivially false.
Let us now apply all this to (2)-(4). Adopting David Lewis' connective for
"would"-counterfactuals, .. 0-- ", we may symbolize these as
2* T 0--+ R
3* Q 0--+ R
4* S 0--+ R

Necessarily, if God does not exist, then God does not create P. On activist
principles, "God creates P" is necessarily true, and so too then is "if God
does not create P, God does not exist." So given activism, we have
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The conjunction of (2*) and (7) entails (4*). (7) is necessarily true (given S4
or SS). For all propositions <I> and'll, if <I> in conjunction with a necessary
truth entails'll, <I> entails'll. So (2 *) entails (4*). Again, on activist principles,
necessarily, God does not exist iff nothing creates P. So by the same sort of
move, we see that (3*) entails (4*). On the principles I am ascribing to theistic
activism, (4*) is a claim about the null world, that if the null world existed,
P would exist. As so taken, (4*) is clearly false. If so, then on our assumptions, (2)-(4) are false. By contrast, (1) remains-unproblematically true. For
as (l)'s antecedent does not involve God's not existing, (1) is still to be
treated as all other counterfactuals with impossible antecedents are. So I think
theistic activism has resources to vindicate its claim that necessary beings
depend on God. For the activist can hold that (1) is true while (2)-(4) are
false, and that this gives the activist claim content.

II. God's power over modality
That necessary beings depend on God entails that though God somehow
causes these beings to exist, God is not in control of their existence: it is not
in His power to refrain from creating them. For were this in God's power,
these would not be genuinely necessary beings. Rather, it would be possible
that they not exist. Now the assertion that God creates the bearers of modal
status (the propositions which are possible and necessary) leads theistic activism to a nearly Cartesian thesis, that God is in a strong sense responsible
for the necessity of what is necessary and the possibility of what is possible.
To activism, necessary beings (or truths) are necessary because God creates
them as existing (or being true) in all possible worlds, and possible beings
(or truths) are possible because God creates them as existing (or being true)
in some possible world. That God could not have done otherwise does not
efface the fact that He alone has done it. Because it grants that God could
not have done other wise, activism rejects such Cartesian claims as that God
can make or could have made some necessary truth non-necessary, or that
God can deny or could have denied existence to some necessary proposition.
But though it denies such Cartesian theses about God and modality, the
activist claim is almost as strong. This emerges in Morris and Menzel's
remarks on the "modal problem of evil."
The modal problem of evil lies in the inconsistency of the following set of
claims:
8. Necessarily, if a world W is actual, God creates W.
9. Necessarily, God is of perfect moral goodness.
10. Possibly an evil world exists.

Given (8), if possibly an evil world exists, then possibly God creates an evil
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world. Thus (10) and (8) in conjunction entail that possibly God creates an
evil world. But plausibly, given (9), God is not possibly the creator of an evil
world. 1o Theistic activism's response to this inconsistency is to deny (10),
holding that since God is necessarily the creator of whatever world exists and
God is necessarily good, no evil world is in fact possible." For activism,
God's nature constrains the possible in such a way that
some maximal groupings of propositions which, if per impossibile God did
not exist, would constitute possible worlds, do not count as genuinely possible worlds due to the constraints placed on possibility by the nature of the
creator. 12

This denial of (10) is not ad hoc, but is a consequence of activism's distinctively theistic metaphysics of modality. For activism, God's causal activity
is the source of whatever reality possible worlds have. But God can act only
in accord with His nature. If it is God's nature to be perfectly good, then He
produces no possible worlds which would be evil if actual. For if God produces such a possible world, then possibly He creates it. But as God is by
nature perfectly good, God's nature is such that God cannot create an evil
world. Thus no evil world is possible. This does not however entail that no
evil world exists. For Morris and Menzel, a world is a set of propositions. So
for them, if a certain set of propositions exists, a certain world exists. A set
exists if its members exist and there are no set-theoretic reasons (such as the
generation of paradoxes) for its not existing. This makes it plausible that evil
worlds do exist, given the reasonable assumption that the propositions composing them also figure in the makeup of non-evil worlds. Thus Morris and
Menzel call evil worlds "maximal groupings of propositions" which do not
"count as" genuine possible worlds, a phrasing which implies that these
groupings (and so these worlds) exist. But again, though these worlds exist,
they are not possible worlds, and God's nature explains why they are not
possible. So for theistic activism, God's nature delimits possibility, preventing evil worlds' being possible.
Now since God does not control what His nature is, this activist position
does not entail that God controls the existence of evil worlds. But it does
show that God's causal responsibility for the existence of abstracta puts His
distinctive stamp on the facts of modality-that even though these facts could
not be otherwise, there is a sense in which God determines their character.
Further, Morris and Menzel hold while God necessarily creates the abstract
entities He creates, the necessity of this creation stems solely from God's
own nature, and this creation is free in the sense that it is "conscious, intentional, and neither constrained nor compelled by anything existing independent of God and his causally efficacious power."13 Thus activism claims for
God an exalted status which Descartes sought to ascribe to Him, that of being
in some sense the free determiner of what is necessary and what is possible.
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Yet activism avoids Descartes' thesis that God could have made the modal
facts other than they are.

III. Problems of Activism
If it is tenable, then, activism offers a variety of features which should
excite theists. Let us however examine this view more closely. For activism,
God necessarily creates necessary truths and beings, yet
the necessity of his creating (these) is not imposed on Him from without, but
rather is a feature and result of the nature of his own activity itself, which is
a function of what he is. 14

That is, God's creation of necessities is necessary in that it freely establishes
a framework of necessities relative to which it counts as necessary, freely
creating the possible worlds which are such that in all of them, God creates
the necessities He does. The activity by which God does this flows only from
Himself. Ultimately, it is necessarily true that 2+2=4 only because God is
what He is-because He is such as to think that necessarily, 2+2.,4. So God's
necessity-creating activity flows from God's nature. That is, it seems that we
can explain this activity, but can explain it only by saying that it takes place
because God is what He is. Theistic activism not only countenances but insists
on this sort of explanation. The activist claims that God's morally perfect
nature puts its stamp on His activity of creating possible worlds. Thus the
activist claims that because God is what He is (Le., because His nature
includes moral perfection), God thinks into possibility only good worlds.
But then just as God's being what He is explains the (alleged) fact that all
possible worlds are good, His being what He is explains the fact that all these
worlds are such that 2+2=4, and indeed explains the whole character of the
realm of necessary truth. In fact, according to activism, it is a necessary truth
that all possible worlds are good, and so God's character's explaining the
goodness of all possible worlds is just one instance of the more general
phenomenon of God's character's explaining the nature of all necessary truth.
In saying that according to activism, God's nature determines that God
shall make 2+2=4 or shall create only good worlds, I am not claiming that
some abstract entity somehow forces God's creative hand. I am saying that
according to activism, God's creating the necessities he does is explained,
and the explanation of this lies solely in God's being what He is. Now God's
being what He is includes His exemplifying the essential attributes He does.
But if God creates all attributes, God creates the attributes He instances
essentially. Morris and Menzel grant this:
God has properties ... essentially ... for whose existence his eternal intellective
activity is creatively responsible. IS
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That God creates His essential attributes, and does so because He is what He
is, leads to three difficulties.
A. God's being what He is includes His instancing His nature, i.e., having
all the attributes which He necessarily has. The attributes which God instance
sexist only because God creates them. But God is able to create them because
He is what He is, i.e., instances His nature. Thus on the activist picture, God's
having His necessary attributes is a causally necessary condition of God's
having His necessary attributes. Thus God is God because God makes it so,
and odder still, God makes it so because He already is God. But this just
seems impossible. It seems that for any states P and Q, if p's obtaining is
causally necessary and sufficient for Q's obtaining, there must be some asymmetrical relation between P and Q such that Q's obtaining presupposes P's
and not vice-versa. No state can have an asymmetrical relation to itself. So
God's having His necessary attributes cannot do so.
B. God's essential attributes exist only if God creates them. But God can
create them only if He instances them, and He instances them only if they
exist. So it seems that to activism, God's attributes' coming to exist presupposes that they already exist. But if they already exist, how can they then be
created? That is, for activism, these attributes' existing is a causally necessary
condition for their existing. Again, this seems impossible.
c. According to activism, God's being what He is explains His creating
the necessities He does. But it also seems that His creating the necessities
He does explains His being what He is, for His necessary character is part of
the structure of necessities He creates. How can this be?
Given these consequences, one might want to drop either the claim that
God's being what He is explains the character of what He creates, or the
claim that God creates His nature. But if the activist drops the first claim, he
gives up his distinctive approach to the modal problem of evil. Nor can he
drop the second. In addition to what has been discussed, activism has two
other reasons to assert that God creates His own nature.
First, its very project requires this. Theistic activism seeks to square Platonism with the traditional theistic belief that everything other than God depends
on God by holding that God is the source of all abstract entities, including
attributes. God has some attributes essentially. If God creates all attributes
save the ones He Himself instances essentially, the claim that whatever exists
depends on God is incompatible with the claim that the attributes which God
instances exist, and so Platonism and traditional theism are to this extent
unreconciled. So if God creates all attributes, as activism maintains, He
creates even the attributes He instances essentially. 16
Again, on the activist account, for any possible state of affairs S, God's
activity explains the fact that S is possible. This leads in a second way to the
position that God creates His nature. For if God makes possible all possible
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states of affairs, and it is possible that God exists, God must make His own
existence possible. Now if something's making itself actual is absurd or
unintelligible, something's making itself possible seems even more so. But
activism offers an account of how God is supposed to do this. According to
activism, God creates the attributes whose conjunction constitutes His nature.
Given S5, that the divine nature exists entails that it has its actual modal
status, as possibly exemplified. For the divine nature to be possibly exemplified is for God's existence to be possible. Thus the activist claim that God
creates His own nature secures the claim that God makes Himself possible.
Thus activism is irrevocably committed to the twin claims which generate
A-C. In section V below, I will consider and reject an activist argument which
if successful would rob A-C of their sting. First, though, I would like to
discuss another problem for activism.
IV. Does God create Himself?

The claim that God creates His essential attributes seems to yield yet a
fourth difficulty: given the common theistic belief that God is necessary by
nature and one plausible modal axiom, it seems to entail that God creates
Himself. Let "G" stand for the proposition "God exists." Then the claim that
God is necessary by nature is that G~ 0 G. This claim leads to the following
argument.
11. G -300.
12.0G.
13. (G -300) -3 (OG -0 00).
14. OG -30 00.
15. ¢OG.
16.¢OG-3G.
17.G.
18. OG--3G

premise.
assumption for conditional proof.
Instance of modal theorem.
11, 13, modus ponens.
12, 14, modus ponens.
instance of Brouwer axiom.
15, 16, modus ponens.
11-17, conditional proof.

Now if God's nature exists, then it is possibly instantiated, i.e., 0 G. So per
(18), if God's nature exists, then God exists: if God creates His nature, He
creates a necessary and sufficient condition of His own existence. This seems
to amount to God's creating Himself. Morris and Menzel claim to avoid this
consequence:
••. the claims we are espousing do not entail that God creates Himself. God
stands in a relation of logical dependence to His nature (a trivial result of the
strict necessity of both relata). His nature stands in a relation of causal
dependence to Him. It simply does not follow that God stands in a relation
of causal dependence to Himself. Relations of logical dependence are always
transitive. Relations of continuous causal dependence are always transitive.
But we have no good reason to think that transitivity always holds across
these two relations. If God creates some bachelor, the existence of this bachelor is logically sufficient for the existence of some unmarried man ... But the

GOD AND ABSTRACT ENTITIES

203

transitivity we thus see across the causal and logical dependence relations
holds only in case the unmarried man is one and the same individual as the
bachelor ... God is not identical with His nature. (So) we can reject the inference that from God's nature causally depending on God, and God's logically
depending on His nature, it follows that God causally depends on Himself.17

The argument, then, is that if God causes His nature to exist, and His nature's
existing entails God's existing, it does not follow that God causes God to
exist, save on the condition that God" God's nature. This argument's crucial
premise is that
19. for all x, y and z, if x causes y to exist, and y's existing entails but does
not cause z's existing, it follows that x causes z to exist only if y"z.

But (19) appears false. Let "T" denote my thought at 4:30 on April 9, 1988,
that I want to have lamb for dinner. Let "E" denote an event in my brain
which took place at or very shortly before T did. Then consider the following
claims:
20. T E.
21. T's existing does not cause E to exist.
22. E causes T to exist, and it is not "broadly logically" possible that anything
other than E directly cause T to exist. (That is, any other thing which causes
T to exist must do so by causing E to exist.)
23. it is not "broadly logically" possible that a non-divine thought exist uncaused.

(22) and (23) jointly entail that
24. T's existence entails E's existence.

(20)-(23) are not obviously inconsistent or incoherent; they make up what is
in fact a: reasonably plausible position. But given (20), (21) and (24), if we
let y = T and z = E, then if some x causes y to exist, it follows that that x
causes z to exist, even though y t< z. Thus if (20)-(23) are true, (19) is false.
Still, some may find the second conjunct of (22) controversial. So let us
construct a second counter-example by changing the referent of "E." Instead
of having "E" denote one particular brain-event, let it denote whatever in any
possible world satisfies the description "the process or activity of thinking
T." In this case (20)-(23) are very likely true. One could respond to these
examples by strengthening (19) to
25. for all x, y and z, if x causes y to exist, and y's existing entails and is entailed by but does not cause z's existing, it follows that x causes z to exist
only ify=z.

But (25) too seems false. For
26. necessarily, E does not exist unless T exists (at some time).

With "E" read in our second way, (26) is true. For with "En so understood,
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E does not exist unless a process of thinking T exists, and nothing can be a
process of thinking T unless it actually manages to think T at some time. 18
(20)-(23) plus (26) constitute a counter-example to (25).
Faced with this further example, one could replace (19) and (25) with
27. for all x, y and z, if x causes y to exist, and y's existing entails and is
entailed by z's, and y does not cause z to exist, and z does not cause y to
exist, it follows that x causes z to exist only if y=z.

But (27) is of no help to Morris and Menzel. In the case of God and God's
nature, x=z, and so it is not possible that x causes y to exist and z does not
cause y to exist: an activist cannot apply (27) to his position.
If my reasoning is correct, then, Morris and Menzel do not manage to show
it false that if God creates His nature, God creates Himself. Can we therefore
conclude that on the activist theory, God creates Himself? In the absence of
any reason not to draw this conclusion, one would think so. One may draw
this conclusion via the claim that
28. for all x, y and z, if x causes y to exist, and y's existing entails and is
entailed by but does not cause z's existing, it follows that x causes z to
exist.

If (28) is true, then if both God and God's nature are necessary beings, God's
creating His nature entails that God creates Himself. In fact, if (28) is true,
then if God exists necessarily, God's creating any necessary being entails that
God creates Himself. But (28) does seem true. For suppose that y=z. In this
case y's existing entails and is entailed by z's but does not cause z's, and in
this case clearly, if x causes y to exist, x causes z to exist. Suppose on the
other hand that y '" z, but still y's existing entails and is entailed by z's but
does not cause z's, and that X cannot cause z to exist because z already exists,
prior to x' action (the priority here may be temporal, causal or logical). If z
exists, I suggest, it follows that y too already exists, prior to x' action (in the
same way z is prior), and so x cannot cause y to exist either. Suppose finally
that y '" z, but still y's existing entails and is entailed by z's but does not
cause z's, and that z does not already exist. If in this case x causes y to exist,
x will do something which entails that z exists, and so z will exist. If x is not
therefore the cause of z's existing, either (a) the laws of logic themselves,
apart from x, then bring z into existence, (b) z comes to exist uncaused, or
(c) some wholly distinct agent causes z to exist, by an extraordinary coincidence, or (d) x's acting logically necessitates that some wholly distinct agent
acts to produce z. As (a)-(d) all appear massively implausible, (28) correspondingly seems plausible.
Still, though (28) is plausible, it is not beyond question. So let me show
that activism entails divine self-creation without relying on (28). Theistic
activism asserts that divine activity accounts for the necessity and truth of
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all necessary truths. But among the necessary truths God's activity thus
accounts for is the truth that God exists. So theistic activism seems committed
to the claim that God's activity makes it true that God exists. This seems to
amount to God's creating Himself. Again, if God's existing is a necessary
state of affairs, and God's activity accounts for the obtaining of all necessary
states of affairs, then God's activity accounts for the obtaining of the state
of affairs that God exists. So it is hard to see how an activist could avoid
affirming that God creates Himself.
Let us note a consequence of this. If my arguments are correct, activism
entails that in all possible worlds, God creates His nature and that in all
possible worlds, God creates Himself. Thus activism must also endorse the
conditional that if God creates His nature, God creates Himself. If (as I will
argue) God cannot create Himself, this conditional will let us infer that God
cannot create His nature either, and so that activism must admit that there
are abstract entities God cannot create.

v.

Can God create Himself?

Now it seems to me that it is just impossible that God create Himself, and
that if theistic activism entails that He does, it is just unacceptable. However,
it has been suggested that perhaps God can create Himself. 19 Suppose that
time is without beginning or end, that God exists at all times, and that for
any time t, God's activity at t-l is responsible for His existence at t. We
can do things which at least help to assure that we will exist later. So why
can't God wholly assure that He will exist later? If He can, and if for every
t at which God exists, God's activity at a prior time accounts for His existence
at t, then at every moment, God exists because God has caused Himself to
exist-and so, it seems, God exists because He has created Himself. Yet we
do not have to say that the state of affairs God's existing is asymmetrically
related to itself. For the relata of our causal relations are not things or states
of affairs taken as occurring timelessly or omnitemporally but occurrences
of states of affairs at different times. 20
Now in this response, the activist depicts God as everlasting causing Himself to continue to exist. God's continuing to exist is not the same state of
affairs as God's existing, even if the obtaining of each strictly implies the
obtaining of the other. For these states of affairs are identical only if in them
the same particular exemplifies the same attribute. But the attributes of existing and continuing to exist are distinct. Every entity has the first but not
the second at the first moment of its existence, and if there are any instantaneous entities (as I doubt) or timeless entities (as I believe there are), they
have the first but not the second. Again, that God continues to exist entails
(and not by a paradox of implication) that there are times, through which God
continues to exist. That God exists does not entail that times exist (save by
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a paradox of implication, if time exists necessarily). Now if the situation
described is one of God's causing Himself to continue to exist, and continuing
to exist'" existing, the activist cannot simply claim to have described God's
causing Himself to exist. He must rather be offering implicitly some such
argument as the following:
29. Possibly, for all t, at t God causes God to continue to exist at t+ 1.
30. Necessarily, for all t, God continues to exist at t iff God exists at t.
31. Necessarily, for all x, y and z, if x causes y, and necessarily, y's existing entails and is entailed by z's existing, x causes z. (The particulars these variables
range over include occurrences of states of affairs, such as God's existing at t.)
32. So possibly, for all t, God at t causes God to exist at t+ 1.
33. Necessarily, if for all t, God at t causes God to exist at t+ 1, then omnitemporally, God causes God to exist.
34. Necessarily, if omnitemporally, God causes God to exist, God creates Himself.
35. So possibly God creates Himself.
This argument fails, I submit, because (34) is false. It seems to me that if
omnitemporally, God causes God to exist, it follows only that God everlastingly
preserves Himself. This is quite a different matter from His everlastingly creating
Himself, because creation and preservation are distinct concepts. 21 That something is created entails that it is brought from non-existence into existence. That
something is preserved does not entail that it is brought from non-existence,
though it does entail that that thing is kept from non-existence. That something
is created does not entail that that thing previously existed, save by a paradox
of implication, if it is the case that necessarily, the thing created previously
existed. That something is preserved does entail (and not by a paradox of implication) that it previously existed and that its past existence is continued. Now
that God at t+ 1 is caused to exist by God at t entails that God existed prior to
t+ 1. If God exists necessarily (as activists hold), He cannot have gone out of
existence between t and t+l, and so necessarily, His existence at t+1 continues
His prior existence. Thus the activist response sketched seems more aptly called
a case of preservation than a case of creation. 22
If this is so, (33) is likely false as well. For I suspect that the difference
between creation and preservation is not merely conceptual: the characteristic
effect of creation is existence, the characteristic effect of preservation is
continuing to exist, and existing and continuing to exist are two distinct
attributes. 23 But if the effect of preservation is continuing to exist, and the
activist picture just sketched is only a case of preservation, then the picture
does not warrant us in asserting that omnitemporally, God causes God to
exist, as (33) says that it does. Rather, it can only warrant the claim that God
causes Himself to continue to exist.
Let me offer a second argument against (34). Even if "God always continues to exist" entails "God always exists," it does not fully explain the latter.
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Even if God always assures His continued existence, one can still intelligibly
ask "but why does God exist at all to assure His existence, rather than always
not exist"? That He has always existed and always assured His continued
existence is not a satisfying answer to this question. 24 Now if P does not fully
explain Q, DP doesn't fully explain [Q; if that all men are mortal does not
fully explain that all triangles are trilateral, neither does the fact that necessarily, all men are mortal fully explain the fact that necessarily, all triangles
are trilateraI.2s So that the question "but why does God exist" seems in place
supports the claim that God's necessarily everlasting continuance (EC) does
not fully explain God's necessarily everlasting existence (EE). This claim,
that
36. Ee does not fully explain EE,

generates an argument, for which I will also need the premises that
37. causal sufficiency is a transitive relation
and that
38. (x)(y)(if x causally suffices for y, x fully explains y).
My argument, then, is this. Given (36) and (38), Ee does not causally suffice
for EE. Then per (37), whatever causally suffices for Ee does not by so doing
causally suffice for EE. In the activist response above, God's activity causally
suffices for Ee. (29)-(35) purport to show that by so doing, He causally
suffices for EE. If (36)-(38) are true, He does not. Thus (27)-(38) constitute
an inconsistent set of propositions; at least one of them is false. The most
rational move is to reject the one with the least intuitive warrant. It seems
clear that this is (34). Hence it is most rational to reject (34). But again, if
(34) is false, the activist response sketched above does not really involve
God's creating Himself.
The activist cannot weaken his claim from "God everlastingly creates Himself' to "God everlastingly preserves Himself." If all God does is cause
Himself to continue, there is a necessary state of affairs for whose obtaining
God is not creatively responsible, namely EE (as vs. EC). To allow this would
amount to giving up the activist project of rooting all necessary facts in the
creative activity of God. So activism remains committed to self-creation, and
does not seem able to provide a model of self-creation which could convince
us that it is possible.
It is of course very plausible that self-creation is in fact not possible. But as
activists dispute this, let me argue it explicitly. To create God is to account
for God's existing at all (as vs. continuing to exist). To account for God's
existing at all is to account for the fact that the set S of times at which God
exists has any members. It seems to me that if God exists beginninglessly, and
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His actions account for His existence at moments later than the moments of
His action, no action of God at any time can account for S' having members.
For suppose that God's action at t does so. Then this action accounts for
S' having members subsequent to t. If God acts at t, t is itself a member of
S. Thus at t, S already has a member, and so whatever prior act of God
accounts for t's membership in S has already sufficed ipso facto to account
for the fact that S has members. Thus God's act at t cannot do so. Suppose
then that God's action at t-l accounts for God's existing at t. Then if God
acts at t-l, t-l is itself a member of S, and so whatever prior act of God
accounts for t-1's membership in S has already accounted for the fact that S
has members, and so on. As God exists beginninglessly, then, no act of His
at any moment can account for the fact that He exists at all. As creating any
entity = accounting for the fact that it exists at all, thus God cannot create
Himself, if His actions account for His existence at later moments. Nor can
we intelligibly suppose that God's actions at t account for His existence
before t. Nor can God at t create God at t, for if God already exists at t, He
cannot then cause Himself to exist at t. Now if God at t cannot cause Himself
to exist (as vs to continue to exist) at, before or after t, God at t cannot create
Himself at all.
If God cannot cause Himself to exist, the activist project of rooting all
necessities in the activity of God fails. Further, we argued above that if God
creates His nature, He creates Himself. If this argument works, then as God
cannot create Himself, it follows that God cannot create His nature. Moreover,
even if this argument be rejected, we have still shown that God cannot create
His nature. Arguments A-C in section III above raised difficulties which seem
if not dispelled to entail that God just cannot do so. When we raised these
arguments, we noted that we would consider an attempt to blunt their force.
This attempt would consist in re-applying the strategy sketched at the start of
this section: it would interpret God's creating His nature as God's acting at
t-l to assure that His nature exists at t, acting at t to assure that His nature
exists at t+l, and so ad infinitum. But we have now shown that on this model,
God would not create His nature, but at most would everlastingly preserve it.
He could not account for its existing at all, rather than not existing. No other
model of God's creation of His nature is available. So we are entitled to
conclude that God just cannot create His nature. If so, the activist reconciliation of Platonism and traditional theism fails in another way, as it falls short
of allowing God to create all abstracta. The failure of activism leaves us the
task of explaining just what God's relation to abstract entities (if there are
such things) may be. Let me close with just a hint of an alternate approach.

VI. On God and possibility
First, let me motivate this alternate approach. Plausibly, possibilities come
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in interlocking systems rather than as discrete, disjoint entities. For instance,
for it to be possible that God exists, it must be possible that a creator ex nihilo
exist. If it is to be possible that a creator ex nihilo exist, worlds which He
can create must be possible. If God is essentially omnipotent, and omnipotence involves (very roughly) being able to actualize all states of affairs which
are in fact possible, all these states of affairs must be possible, as part of what
it is for God to be possible. Suppose now that God is possible and cannot
make Himself possible: that is, cannot create His nature. Plausibly, if God
cannot make Himself possible, He cannot make possible any state of affairs
whose possibility is bound up with His-that is, any other fact of possibility.
Rather, all states of affairs must then be possible "logically before" God
exists. The realm of possibility must on this assumption exist independent of
God. If this realm consists of Platonic entities, then, Platonism must remain
unreconciled with traditional theism.
Further, we saw above that
18. ¢ G -3G.

If this is so, then arguably whatever accounts for God's being possible suffices to account for His being actual. Now if possibilities come in interlocked
systems, and God's existing is possible, it seems that God possibly exists
because there exists an appropriate network of possibilities, one which includes His being possible. If God possibly exists and cannot make Himself
possible, then the realm of possibility exists independent of Him. Its nature
accounts for the truth of []G. So its nature arguably accounts for the truth of
G. Thus if God possibly exists and cannot make Himself possible, it can seem
that God is a creature of an independent, antecedently given realm of possibilities. Not God but the realm of possibility is the ultimate source of all that
exists, if this is so, because the realm of possibility gives rise to God, from
whom all else stems. Theists will surely object to this.
So if God possibly exists and cannot make Himself possible, arguably God
cannot account for the facts of modality or the existence of any necessary
abstracta these facts involve, and God is a creature and servant of Ideal
masters. Both consequences conflict with traditional theism; hence if these
consequences do follow, the traditional theist must modify his stance or reject
one of the premises. We have seen that God in fact cannot make Himself
possible. 26 This suggests that if the above argument is correct, traditional
theists should consider denying that possibly God exists.
A second motivation for this denial arises from the problems we have raised
for theistic activism. Theistic activism ran into trouble because it held God
to be an instance of attributes He creates: because God's nature was among
the exemplifiable entities the activist's God creates. Now God's nature is an
exemplifiable entity iff possibly God exists. So activism can also be said to
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stumble because it claims that the God who is the ground of possibility is
Himself possible. Again, activism went awry because "God exists" was
among the necessary truths for whose truth it held God to be responsible. Yet
an activist cannot hold that God exists contingently, for no contingent being
could create a necessary entity. Now every actual existent which also possibly
exists exists contingently or necessarily. One sympathetic to activism's program might, therefore, want to consider holding that while God actually
exists, He does not possibly exist-that is, that while God actually exists, He
is not the sort of entity which one can say possibly exists. If this claim could
be maintained, it would secure the activist's extension of God's creative
activity to necessary abstracta and the facts of modality while avoiding the
difficulties to which activism fell prey.

VII. Pure actuality and abstract entities
Can a traditional theist deny that God possibly exists? I think so. Though
it sounds outrageous, this denial is not new. That God actually exists but does
not possibly exist is precisely the import of Aquinas' claim that God is pure
actuality. Part of what Aquinas means by this is that in God there are no
unactualized possibilities. But he also means that in God there are no actualized possibilities either. Thomas writes in the Summa Contra Gentiles that
In every composite there must be act and potency. For several things cannot
become absolutely one unless among them something is act and something
potency. Now, beings in act are not united except by being, so to speak,
bound or joined together ... Their parts, likewise, are brought together as being
in potency with respect to the union, since they are united in act after being
potentially unitable. But in God there is no potency. Therefore there is no
composition in Him. 27

Aquinas' point is that God cannot contain components because if He did, an
aspect of His being would be a fulfilled potentiality that these components
come together to compose Him. That Aquinas sees this as incompatible with
God's being purely actual indicates that for him, God's pure actuality excludes both unfulfilled and fulfilled potentialities. Now Aquinas often distinguishes potentialities from mere logical possibilities, and in some contexts
the distinction is important for him.28 Here, though, it is not. According to
Thomas, God's power ranges over the full extent of the logically possible. 29
Hence if God is possibly F, God has the power to effect it that God is F and
so God is potentially F: corresponding to a possibility for God, realized or
unrealized, there would be a potentiality in God, realized or unrealized. 30
Thus God can be without realized potentiality only if He is not in any respect
the actualization of a possibility.
This entails that in a language perspicuously representing the divine being,
on Aquinas' terms, locutions such as "possibly God ..... or "God possibly .....
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would be banned, even as consequences of locutions such as "actually
God ... " or "God actually .... " We place an entity within the framework of
possible worlds to represent formally the truth-conditions of statements of
possibility about that entity (and statements of actuality and necessity, insofar
as these are connected with possibility). Hence if strictly speaking, there
cannot be statements of possibility about God, He is not the sort of thing that
can properly be "located" within a possible world.
If God, though actual, is not possible, then God's actuality or activity can
account for all possibility without having to account for His own possibility.
Further, if God cannot exist within a possible world, He cannot exemplify any
of the attributes facts about which constitute the framework of necessary truths
which all possible worlds instantiate (for if He did exemplify these, He would
ipso facto exist within a possible world). Thus God can create all abstract entities
without instantiating any of them. The claim that God is purely actual, then,
reconciles theism and Platonism while avoiding Cartesianism (as activism does)
and also avoiding the distinctive difficulties of activism.
VIII. Some explanations
The Thomist thesis I have briefly set forth raises a great many questions.
I hope to deal with some of these on a future occasion, but several may seem
too pressing to ignore. First, the Thomist claim that God is purely actual is
certainly not supposed to entail that the proposition "God actually exists" is
false. But "God actually exists" entails that possibly God exists, and if God
is purely actual, it is false that possibly God exists. So if God is purely actual,
must we deny that God actually exists, or deny the venerable dictum that ab
esse ad posse valet consequentia? Again, what happens to modal discourse
generally and to modal talk about God in particular given the Thomist thesis?
Finally, what can one mean by saying that God exists, but not in a possible
world?
Thomas suggests a response to the first question in Contra Gentiles:
we do not know of what sort this being is ... by which God subsists in Himself
... (in) reference ... to the being that signifies the composition of intellect. .. the
existence of God does fall under demonstration; this happens when our mind
is led from demonstrative arguments to form ... a proposition of God whereby
it expresses that He exists. 3l

Strictly speaking, then, for Thomas, what we demonstrate is not so much that
God exists as that some proposition affirming the existence of God is true. 32
The actuality we can demonstrate is not the actual being of God, but the actual
truth of a proposition. 33 Now Thomas' arguments for God's existence provide
him with identifying descriptions for God, whence he infers all the attributes
that he subsequently ascribes to God: having argued that (for instance) an
unmoved mover exists and is identical with God, Thomas derives divine
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attributes by exploring the attributes which an unmoved mover must have. 34
Thus this restriction of the "actually" in "God actually exists" to the actual
truth of a proposition extends to "an unmoved mover actually exists," and
thence to all the theses of both rational and dogmatic theology.
Actuality can be construed as a modality interrelated with necessity and
possibility. Thus I suggest that on Thomas' account, ordinary modalities
which occur in talk about God are not to be construed as modifying the divine
being, but rather as modifying propositions about God. Specifically, such
modalities tie these propositions to worlds in which it is correct to assert
them. An analogy will set out what I have in mind. Were I in a delivery-room,
watching the birth of a child, I might very well say "God has here become
the Creator of a new person." But I would not mean by this that God occupied
any volume of space in the delivery room, or had been just to the left of the
operating table. Rather, I would use "here" to refer only to the place at which
a new predicate became ascribable to God. Again, if I hold that God is
timeless, then if I say "God is now the Creator of a new person," I will explain
my statement by saying that "now" refers not to a time at which God is
located, but merely to the time of the proposition's utterance, a time at which
it is true to say that God is (timelessly) the Creator of a new person. I suggest,
then, that by analogy, for Thomas, when we say "actually God exists and
therefore possibly God exists," the modal terms' semantics are to be given
in terms of possible worlds in which it is correct to affirm that God exists,
not possible worlds in which God exists. With this given, all standard modal
entailments apply to propositions about God (and so the claim that God is
purely actual in no way conflicts with any truths of modal logic ). For instance,
though God does not exist in any possible world, in every possible world it
is true to say that God exists and that therefore, in some possible world it is
true to say that God exists. Thus it remains the case that "God actually exists"
entails that possibly God exists. In the same way, all tense-logical entailments
apply to tensed propositions about a timeless God. One need not infer that
God exists during the times one's semantics involve, nor in the worlds one's
semantics involve.
With this understood, we can see why God's being beyond the modal
framework of reality does not affect the fact that there are necessary and
contingent truths about God. These truths acquire their modal status according as the statements they make about God are true at (not in) the various
possible worlds, just as truths about a timeless God acquire their temporal
status according as the statements they make are true at, not in, the various
times. Their modal differences are functions not of differences in God but of
differences in possible worlds. "God created Adam" is contingent not because
God has a contingent attribute but because it is true at some but not all worlds
that Adam exists and is created by God. 3s Obviously, a full treatment of this
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idea would require a lot more work than it can receive here. But its prospects
strike me as promising.
Now it is customary to introduce the de re/de dicta distinction in a rough
and ready way by saying that modalities de re are modalities in which things
have attributes and modalities de dicta are those in which propositions have
truth-values. So my account thusfar raises a question: if all divine modalities
are modalities of propositions, does it follow that they are all only de dicto?
I think not. A more precise explication of the de re/de dicto distinction would
note that both sorts of modalities are after all modalities of propositions.
Following a suggestion of Kit Fine's, we may say that propositions whose
modalities are de dicta are such that their truth-value does not vary if we vary
the reference of their singular terms (or equivalent devices for picking out
bearers of attributes), and propositions whose modalities are de re are such
that their truth values do vary if we vary the reference of their singular terms
or equivalent devices.
In explicating what I take to have been Aquinas' implicit position, I have
appealed to the idea that God does not exist within possible worlds. One may
well wonder what this can mean. I think that at least two other historic
metaphysical systems incorporate the claim that God does not exist within
possible worlds. Arguably Leibniz, the grandfather of possible worlds semantics, held that possible worlds are creatures of God which are sets or groupings
of other creatures of God, and that God, as their creator, is not included in any
such set. 36 Again, for Plotinus, God creates all necessary abstracta and yet
exemplifies none, being above and beyond "the realm of Being," i.e., the
Platonic domain. Thus the writings of Leibniz and Plotinus (as well as
Aquinas) may give us some way to picture God's transcendence of possibility.
A formal explication of God's transcendence of possibility might be that
no predication of or identity-statement involving God is included in any
world-constituting set of propositions, rather as no predication of or identitystatement involving God is included in any group of propositions true in some
particular moment. If one indexes propositions to times in which they are
true, for instance, one must index all predications of or identity-statements
involving a timeless God not to any time, but instead to one more timelike
locus, that of eternity. Similarly, if one indexes propositions to worlds in
which they are true, one must index all predications of and identity-statements
involving a purely actual God not to any possible world, but instead to one
more worldlike locus, that of pure actuality.
IX. Vale et salve
The claim that God is purely actual eliminates the problems we have seen
theistic activism to face. Yet this claim does the job activism tried to do, in
that it makes God the source of abstracta and the ground of modal facts. So
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perhaps theistic activists might have something to gain by moving a bit closer
to classic Thomism and its claim that God is purely actual. This is not to say
that the claim that God is purely actual is without its own problems. The
claim that God has no attributes which creatures instantiate, for instance,
threatens to force us to a radically negative theology, as it did Plotinus. I
believe that it does not force us to this, and that the concept of pure actuality
has exciting ramifications in philosophical theology. But these will have to
await another occasion. 37
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1. In all future occurrences, unqualified modal terms such as "necessary," "impossible,"
"contingent," or "possible" will express "broadly logical" modality.
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in worlds in which all their members exist. Propositions whose truth-conditions include
contingent entities are also non-necessary abstracta if what Alvin Plantinga calls "existentialism" is true. On this view, such propositions exist only if the contingent entities
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which there is no Charles Schulz, the proposition that Charles Schulz is the creator of
Peanuts does not exist. (For an exposition of an existentialist position, cf. Robert M.
Adams, "Actualism and Thisness," Synthese 49 (1981), pp. 3-41.) Also, if attributes
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means to claim only that God thinks in every world the same proposition-creating
thoughts. The broader claim that God has all the same thoughts in every world is
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the thought that constitutes the proposition P, "W is the actual world." But if God is
omniscient, then only in W does He believe or know that P. Now if God is a perfect
knower, He does not forget what He knows or become unaware of what He knows: all
His knowledge is occurrent, not dispositional. Let us now suppose that God's occurrent
believing or knowing that P - His thinking some thought which He thinks in all worlds.
As God thinks this thought in all worlds, God believes that P in all worlds. This yields
two alternatives. Perhaps in all worlds, God believes that W is actual although this is not
true in any world but W, i.e., perhaps God is in error about P in all worlds but W. Again,
perhaps God believes P in every world and therefore (God being essentially omniscient)
it follows that P is true in every world. In this case, W is the only possible world, since
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only in W is P true. Neither of these alternatives is acceptable. Therefore it is false that
God's occurrent believing or knowing that P - His thinking that P. God's knowing that
P, then, must constitute a mental act distinct from His thinking the proposition that P. IT
this is so, there seems no reason to deny that this mental act occurs only in W.
5. Thomas Morris and Christopher Menzel, "Absolute Creation," American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (1986), pp. 353-62. (The essay also appears in Morris' Anselmian
Explorations (Notre Dame, IN: (University of Notre Dame Press, 1986).) The locution
"God thinks attributes" seems more appropriate to activism than "God thinks ofattributes."
For the latter may suggest that attributes somehow exist independent of God's thought
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the nature of numbers and for set theory. Cf. his "Theism, Platonism and the Metaphysics
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world, cf. Adams, op. cit.
10. This is the main argument of Theodore Guleserian's "God and Possible Worlds: the
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15. Ibid., p. 359.
16. Ibid.
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18. Aristotle and Ryle argue that for a range of mental-life expressions, the present
progressive entails a perfect: that seeing entails having seen, for instance. IT seeing entails
having seen, though, nothing is a process of seeing which does not actually manage to see
at some time. One way to defend the text's claim would be to argue that Aristotle and
Ryle are right and that thinking T is like seeing in the relevant respects.
19. By an anonymous referee for Faith and Philosophy. The strategy of this reply can
apply as well against the arguments of sec. m.
20. Richard Swinburne considers and rejects a similar theory of divine self-causation
in The Coherence of Theism (London: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 261-62. (On
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necessary fact. But that would not prevent his argument from applying to the present
theory if it works.) Swinburne rejects this theory because
when b is the cause of a, and c is the cause of b, we say that the cause of a
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+ b is c, not b + c. If c is the lighting of a fuse, b is an explosion caused by
c, and a an explosion caused by b, then the cause of a + b is just c ... (Thus)

S is the cause of the occurrence of a collection of states if and only if it is a
collection of the causes of each, which are not members of the former collection ... It follows ... that if God's existence at each moment of time is
brought about by God acting at a prior moment of time (and God's existence
has no other cause than his actions), that the whole series of God's states at
each moment of infinite time ... has no cause. For nothing from outside the
series is in any way responsible for the existence of the members of the series.
Certainly given that at some time God is, his subsequent existence will indeed
be due to his actions. But what has no cause .. .is the non-existence of a time
before which God was not (loc. cit.).
I am leery of this argument because I am unsure that the principle it is based on can
really support its weight. Swinburne is correct about what "we say" of the cause of a + b,
but just why do "we say" it? It strikes me as at least plausible that we do so solely because
ascribing a + b to b + c sounds redundant or sounds like a case of self-causation (though
it is not one), rather than because in sober fact the cause is not b + c. (Further, denying
that the cause is b + C arguably is an instance of what Swinburne stigmatizes as the
"completist fallacy" in The Existence of God (London: Oxford University Press, 1979),
pp. 73-74, 87-89.) A fuller investigation of causality would be needed to assure us that
Swinburne's principle is based on the real nature of causation rather than a peculiarity of
colloquial English usage.
21. Cf. Duns Scotus, Quodlibet 12.
22. Note that Morris and Menzel's ingenious "materialization machine" example (cf.
Morris,op. cit., pp. 174-76) is expressly only a case of self-preservation.
23. Thus I suggest that authors such as Aquinas are overlooking something when they
equate God's preservation of creatures with creatures' constant creation (though it may
be that as they say, the same divine activity effects both). Cf. Aquinas, STIa 104, 1 (cf.
44,1).
24. Nor, given activism, is it an acceptable answer to say that God exists because it is
necessary that He do so. For on the activist stance, the fact that God exists necessarily is
a causal consequence of the fact we are trying to explain, the fact that God exists at all.
25. Perhaps this principle is true because if within a single world W there is no
connection between P and Q sufficient for P to fully explain Q, that connection cannot be
created by having P and Q occur, disconnected, in all possible worlds. The text's principle
follows from the thesis that if 0 P fullyexplains 0 Q, P fully explains Q. This latter seems
very plausible: if that necessarily Socrates is a man fully explains that necessarily Socrates
is mortal, it does seem to follow that Socrates' being a man fully explains Socrates' being
mortal.
26. At least, He cannot do so in the way activism depicts. But activism is the only
position available which suggests that He can do so at all.
27. Summa Contra Gentiles I, tr. A. C. Pegis (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press. 1955) (henceforth SCG
c. 18. p. 103.
28. Cf. e.g., SCG 82 (7). 83 (4). pp. 261-62,264.
29. Summa Contra Gentiles II, tr. J. Anderson (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1956), c. 22, pp. 65-67.
30. If this is correct, there is a flaw in the interpretation of Aquinas Norman Kretzmann

n.

GOD AND ABSTRACT ENTITIES

217

and Eleonore Stump offer in their MAbsolute Simplicity," Faith and Philosophy 2 (1985),
pp. 353-82. For them, God is purely actual because He has no potentialities, where these
are understood as liabilities to undergo some change during the history of some world.
But on their view, pure actuality excludes only potentialities, not possibilities. Thus for
them, God's pure actuality is compatible with His realizing alternate possibilities in
different worlds, something which they seem to think required if God is to have contingent
attributes. Because they construe God's pure actuality as His lack of potentiality but not
of possibility, they feel comfortable in construing His correlative simplicity as His lacking
all attributes whose distinction is evident within a possible world (Le.,lacking all attributes
with respect to which He can change within a world-history) but not all attributes whose
distinction is evident between possible worlds (i.e., attributes with respect to which God
can differ intrinsically from one possible world to the next). I suggest that the StumpKretzmann view, while faithful to Aquinas' text, misreads his underlying intent. It seems
to me that in the unique case of God, potentiality and possibility are necessarily correlative.
(Obviously, if God is potentially F, He is possibly F. Hence given the text's argument, in
God's case, potentially FH possibly F.) This entails the view of pure actuality the text
endorses. It also entails that God cannot have attributes with respect to which He can differ
intrinsically from one possible world to the next. It does not however follow that potentiality and possibility are necessarily correlative within discourse about God, and I suggest
that this provides the reason Aquinas distinguishes the two in talking about the modalities
of the divine will (loc. cit., n. 28). Some of what I think is going on in such passages is
spelled out in the text.
31. SCG I, 12 (7), p. 85.
32. For an exploration of the roots and implications of this part of Thomas' religious
epistemology, cf. Victor Preller's Divine Science and the Science o/God (princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1967).
33. Of course, if this proposition is actually true, God (purely-actually) exists. Thomas'
point is that our epistemic relation to God does not enable us to understand or express His
actual being, while our epistemic relation to propositions does let us understand them and
affirm their truth.
34. SCG I, 14 (4), p. 97.
35. What I say here parallels Thomas' move in regard to temporal predications of God
e.g., at Summa Theologiae Ia 13,7.
36. Cf. Leibniz, Monadology, # #43-46, 53, in Leibniz: Philosophical Writings, tr. Mary
Morris (NY: Dutton, 1934), pp. 10-11, 12.
37. This paper has benefitted from the comments of William Alston, Robert McKim
and an anonymous referee for Faith and Philosophy.

